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CONFIDENTIAL

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG

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Secretary of State for the Environment
Department of the Environment
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7 January 1985

Dear John

SELECTIVE RATE LIMITATION IN 1985-86: SETTING OF RATE AND PRECEPT LIMITS

Thank you for your letter of 20 December.

The Chief Secretary is content with the approach you propose. He is glad to note that major public comments by Ministers on rate limitation are being cleared with the Treasury.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Andrew Turnbull (No. 10), Janet Lewis-Jones (Lord President's office), Hugh Taylor (Home Office), Elizabeth Hodkinson (Department of Education and Science), John Graham (Scottish Office), Colin Jones (Welsh Office), Steve Godber (Department of Health and Social Security), David Normington (Department of Employment), Dinah Nichols (Department of Transport), Iain Jack (Lord Advocate's Department), Paul Thomas (Lord Gowrie's Office), Alex Galloway (Paymaster General's Office), Murdo Maclean (Chief Whip's Office), David Beamish (Government Whip's Office, Lords) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Richard

R J BROADBENT
Private Secretary

LOCAL GOVT: Rels

Pt 24

File

TARGETS

Q1. How do these targets discharge the commitment to set fairer targets for low-spending authorities?

A1. All authorities budgeting this year to spend ¼% or more below GRE are getting targets for next year which allow spending to increase in line with inflation, by 4½%. Even the lowest spenders' targets this year implied real terms cuts of about 2%. That comparison shows clearly how I have been able to discharge to the letter my undertaking to the House last January. On top of that we have given a modest extra improvement to targets to those authorities spending at or very close to target as well as below GRE. These are allowed up to a 4.625% increase in spending.

Q2. But won't low-spending authorities' targets next year be even further below GRE than they are this year? How does that square with the commitment to take greater account of GREs in setting targets?

A2. In proposing next year's targets last July, I took greater account of authorities spending against GRE in the current year. All those more than ¼% below GRE get a more generous target than ever before, which allows spending to increase in line with inflation. If an authority's GRE has gone up by more than 4.5%, that is a bonus since it gets more grant for spending at target than it would otherwise have got. It does not follow that its expenditure needs to go up faster than inflation.

[If pressed: GREs change between years for a number of reasons, including changes in GRE assessment methodology. As we try to improve GREs they are bound to fluctuate. But if an authority gains from a change in GRE methodology, it gets more grant but it does not follow that its year-on-year spending increase should reflect that assessment change.]

Q3. How do you justify the discrimination of this year's methodology between those above target but below GRE, many of whom get virtually the maximum increase allowed (eg Cambridgeshire) with those like Nottinghamshire, who have overspent target by little more but because of overspending GRE have lost some £7m from their 1985/86 target?

A3. With scarce resources, I must make difficult choices about their distribution. The general principles adopted for 1985/86 targets have the effect of distributing resources towards those spending below GRE. Those like Nottinghamshire whose budgets in 1984/85 are above both target and GRE inevitably lose out.

Q4. Why does the GLC get a target 64% higher than this year's when Norfolk only gets 4.6%?

A4. The aim for 1985/86 is to set realistic targets. The GLC's 1985/86 target implies a 6% real terms cut on their 1984/85 budgeted expenditure. I do not think it would be sensible to expect greater cuts in a single year. Most low spenders' targets, by contrast, allow spending to increase broadly in line with expected inflation. That in the true measure of the relative severity of the targets I am proposing for next year.

Q5. Why is Basingstoke's reward for spending 5% below target this year a cash cut in target for next year? Is not this an incentive to increase spending?

A5. Basingstoke's 1985/86 target represents an effective increase of 4.625% on their 1984/85 budget, the maximum permitted under this year's methodology, and allows them to increase their spending broadly in line with inflation. Their target is therefore the most generous permitted under the methodology, and given the resource constraints, represents the largest increase in spending we were able to allow.

Q6. How can responsible authorities just over target but above GRE, like Hillingdon, manage next year with a target less than 3¾% above this year's budget?

A6. [Hillingdon] is budgeting to spend over [10%] above their GRE in 1984/85 and like all authorities spending above target and GRE its target next year is a 3.75% increase over its target this year. This is more generous than the 1984/85 methodology, under which [Hillingdon] would have got only a 2½% increase over this year's target.

Q7. Isn't the adjustment to targets to reflect the change to a capital-only TSG unfair to responsible transport authorities with low subsidies to public transport?

A7. We have merely altered all transport authorities' targets by the amount of TSG which they budgeted to take to revenue this year. In that way we have sought to ensure that the change to a capital-only TSG does not mean that the targets for next year are tougher than they would otherwise have been. No authority gets a lower target next year as a result of this adjustment.

HOLDBACK

Q1. The holdback tariff is far too harsh on authorities who only overspend by a small amount?

A1. Holdback is certainly tougher than this year. But the targets are more generous. With more generous targets it does not seem unreasonable to impose stiffer penalties for exceeding them.

Q2. Why not disregard X category of expenditure?

A2. I shall consider all representations for disregards before implementing holdback in the summer.

Q3. Would it not be reasonable to have less severe holdback penalties for authorities over target but well below GRE?

A3. All authorities well below GRE this year are getting targets for next year allowing their spending to increase broadly in line with inflation. I am not yet convinced that their spending needs to increase at a faster rate. But before I implement holdback in the summer I undertake to consider all requests for alterations to the scheme I am proposing today.

Q4. Won't you operate the existing disregards for Urban Programme/joint finance community care schemes more generously?

A4. I am proposing to disregard year on year increases in expenditure in the same way as in the current year. But I undertake to consider alternatives.

GRANT QUANTUM

Q1. The cut from 51.9% to 48.7% in the grant percentage means massive rate rises. Why do you not restore grant to the level (61%) you inherited, as requested by 30 local authorities under the auspices of the Local Government Campaign Unit?

A1. Each year when we have cut the grant percentage there are alarmist predictions of massive rate increases. But the average rate increase has fallen in each of the last 4 years. In 1983/84 for example we reduced the percentage by just over 3%, as we are doing for next year, and the average rate increase was 6½% lower than in 1982/83.

Many in local government want Central Government to finance a smaller proportion of local authority spending, because that increases local authorities accountability to their local electorate.

Aggregate Exchequer Grant next year is about the same in cash as it is for the current year. I hope that as in all recent years local authorities will budget sensibly and confound the alarmist predictions of the RH Members.

Addition to Flag D

Q2. Why are you cutting the grant percentage again?

A2. In each year since 1979 when we have reduced the grant percentage, the average rate increase has in fact been lower than it was in the previous year, when the grant percentage was higher. The key point of course is that cutting the grant percentage adds to the grant pressure which we can put on authorities to find economies in their spending, and reduced spending leads to lower rate increases.

[Examples can be drawn from the table below.]

Year	Grant percentage (settlement)	Average domestic rate poundage	Average domestic rate increase on previous year
1980/81	61.0%	100.1p	27.4%
1981/82	59.1%	122.3p	22.2%
1982/83	56.1%	140.4p	14.7%
1983/84	52.8%	150.2p	7.0%
1984/85	51.9%	159.9p	6.4%
1985/86	48.7%	-	-

CURRENT EXPENDITURE PROVISION

Q1. Surely the expenditure groups told you in July that a £1.7bn uplift on the PES provision is required?

A1. The expenditure groups estimated the cost of continuing authorities present policies, and the projections were based on the local authority associations estimates of likely inflation. After the necessary classification changes and using the Government's inflation estimate, the local authority bid of £1.7bn is equivalent to £1.4bn. The uplift of over £800m which I have announced today goes more than half way to meet them. We all know that there is ample scope for savings in local government. It is surely not unreasonable to ask local government to come the rest of the way to meet us.

Q2. Cuts of even £600m are unrealistic and would cause major disruptions to services. Will not the Government accept that their public expenditure plans are unrealistic?

A2. The plans are more difficult now because authorities in aggregate have failed to meet our targets up till now. Moderation in wage settlements in a crucial factor. If average wage settlements in local government had been only 1% lower than they were in each of the financial years 1981/82 to 1983/84, current expenditure for the same volume of services would have been about 2¼% less than it was in 1983/84. That is an overspend of around £300m or 1.5% on settlement rather than the £760m or 3.9% that actually occurred. If in those years local authority employees had settled in accordance with the Government's public sector pay guidelines current expenditure would have been within the Government's plans. The more that is spent on pay the less there is available for services.

Q3. What will be the implications on the police/fire/education service?

A3. It is for local authorities to decide how much to spend and on what services, within the realistic targets I have set them.

2f.

BLOCK GRANT DISTRIBUTION 1985/86

Grant Related Expenditure Assessments (GREs)

Q. What changes have you made to GREs for 1985/86?

A. There are completely new GREs for passenger transport subsidies and for highway maintenance. These are an essential part of the shift from supporting these costs through TSG to supporting them through block grant, and I believe they represent a real advance for the GRE system. There are also important improvements in GREs for rate fund support to council housing and for recreation, and in the allowance for higher labour costs in and around London.

Q. Do you accept that the move to capital-only TSG is premature, and that the new transport GREs are far too weak?

A. No. The move to capital-only TSG reduces the proportion of local authority costs supported by specific and supplementary grants, and increases the proportion supported by the more general block grant. I know that will be welcomed by many people in local government because it increases their freedom to set their own priorities. I believe the new transport GREs are fully equal to the task.

Q. Don't the changes in housing GREs this year show that a number of inner city authorities have been massively disadvantaged in previous years?

A. Support for council housing is a particularly difficult service to assess in GREs - not least because the level of support needed is only the residual of very large expenditure and income items. I fully accept that the old method of assessment had reached the end of its useful life. The new method is more refined and makes much more use of up-to-date information on each authority's housing revenue account. I believe it is a real improvement. Any losses as a result of the new method are of course safety netted in the usual way.

Block Grant Mechanisms

Q. Why have you increased the slope of the block grant poundage schedule?

A. Raising the slope of the schedule increases the importance of spending in relation to GRE in the distribution of grant. It therefore helps meet my general aim of helping those authorities which have always pursued prudent spending policies.

Q. Isn't this a device to shift grant to the shire counties at the expense of many inner city authorities?

A. No. I felt that it was right to increase the weight given to GREs in grant distribution. But this benefits all authorities whose spending is at or below GRE. I do not think inner city authorities as a group have cause for complaint. Many of them do well out of the GRE changes in this year's settlement.

Q. Doesn't the move to capital-only TSG mean heavy losses for authorities whose passenger transport and highway maintenance spending was supported by TSG in the past?

A. No. These costs are now supported through block grant, and there are new GREs for these services. Any losses as a result of the transition have been safety netted in the usual way.

Q. Why have you made a special offset from the London poundage schedule for London Regional Transport?

A. From 1985/86, LRT will be funded by the Exchequer. Part of the cost will be offset by a specific levy on ratepayers in the capital. This levy has to be taken into account in the block grant arrangements, and that is what I have done. I believe that the result is a fair deal for London ratepayers - it puts them in a similar position to ratepayers elsewhere who pay for public transport subsidies through the rates.

Q. Doesn't the introduction of rate-capping mean that capped authorities will get more grant in 1985/86, at the expense of shire authorities?

A. In recent years the shire authorities have benefitted from a windfall gain at the beginning of each financial year, because a few extravagant authorities have budgetted at such a high level that they have forfeited all their grant. In 1985/86 rate limitation will prevent them budgetting in this irresponsible way, and present windfall gains for other authorities. But the shire authorities should not lose out in any other sense.

PJ

RSG SETTLEMENT BRIEFING

<u>RSG Supplementary Reports</u>

Q. Why a further Supplementary Report for <u>1984/85</u> now? Why have you not allowed a disregard for_____? How do you justify a Report just for Liverpool?

A. The main purpose of this Supplementary Report is to put Liverpool City Council on the same footing as every other local authority in England. Liverpool's budget was received too late to be incorporated in the first Supplementary Report last July. Now that we have their budget, this Report implements £3m holdback for Liverpool, after disregarding £1.6m of the City Council's expenditure. It would not have been fair to those other authorities to defer this Report. I will consider all requests for disregards before making the next Supplementary Report for 1984/85.

Q. Why a further Supplementary Report for <u>1983/84</u> now?

A. We are making this Report now in response to a request from local government representatives. They share my aim that, wherever possible, we should minimise the number of Supplementary Reports for any year and should make them as early as practicable after the end of the year. (The Report will be implemented in April 1985, to enable local authorities to take account of its effects when setting their rates for 1985/86).

Q. Why do Islington receive £9.3m extra grant for 1983/84?

A. The Council's reported outturn expenditure is £6.5 million below their budget for 1983/84. This lower level of spending entitles Islington to £4.1 million more grant before holdback, and also reduces their holdback liability by £5.2 million.

LOCAL AUTHORITY EXPENDITURE IN ENGLAND 1984/85 AND 1985/86

£m Cash

1984/85 SETTLEMENT AND BUDGETS (unadjusted)

		Current Expenditure	Total Expenditure
Settlement provision		20,389	20,542
Increase over PEWP provision	£m	540	-
	%	2.8%	-
LA 1984/85 budgets		21,446	21,390
Overspend on settlement provision	£m	1,057	848
	%	5.2%	4.1%

1985/86 PROPOSED SETTLEMENT

		Current Expenditure	Total Expenditure
PEWP Provision (Cmnd 9143) February 1984 (a)		20,493	-
Settlement provision		21,314	21,815
Increase over PEWP provision(a)	£m	821	-
	%	4.0%	-
Increase over 1984/85 provision	£m	1,246(b)	1,309(d)
		6.2%	6.4%
Comparison with LA 1984/85 budgets	£m	+ 267(c)	+ 538(c) (d)
	%	+ 1.27%	+ 2.5%

For comparison : rate of inflation (GDP) expected to be 4½%, 1984/85 to 1985/86

(a) Adjusted for NIS abolition and classification changes (-£132m for LRT and -£62m for NAFE)

(b) Adjusted for NIS abolition and classification changes (-£125m for LRT and -£60m for NAFE)

(c) 1984/85 budgets adjusted for NIS abolition and classification changes (-£196m for LRT and -£60m for NAFE)

(d) After capital only TSG adjustment (+ £268m on 1984/85)

NB LRT adjustment to provision - £125M in 1984/85 and - £132m in 1985/86, but GLC budgeted to spend £196m on LRT in 1984/85.

AGGREGATE EXCHEQUER GRANT

	£m	
	1984/85	1985/86
Relevant Expenditure at settlement	22,883	24,161
Budgeted relevant expenditure	23,801	-
Grant at settlement	11,872	11,764
% of settlement relevant expenditure	51.9%	48.7%
Grant after holdback	11,417	-
% of settlement relevant expenditure	49.9%	-
Grant at 2nd supplementary report (a)	11,497	-
% of <u>budgeted</u> relevant expenditure	48.3%	-

(a) Aggregate Exchequer grant is reduced by holdback of £455m but increased because of increased specific grant in respect of the excess of budgeted expenditure on police etc over settlement.

LIVERPOOL CITY COUNCIL

Q1. Why have you set Liverpool a target which totally ignores the problems they face?

A1. Liverpool's target has been set according to the same principles as every other authority. I have repeatedly made clear that there will be no special treatment for Liverpool.

Q2. But against the budget the Council say they need this target could lead to Liverpool losing all their grant, and so to either massive rate increases or massive cuts in jobs and services?

A2. Liverpool's problem is not its expenditure target but the deliberate failure of its Labour Leaders to run the City's finances properly. Their target is tough, but it is the Council who are acting irresponsibly: they have ignored the breathing space offered by the settlement of this year's budget in the Summer. Far from putting their house in order they are allowing a deficit to build up and are threatening to plunge their City into chaos.

.../2

Q3 How do you justify a Report just for Liverpool?

A3 The main purpose of this Supplementary Report is to put Liverpool City Council on the same footing as every other local authority in England. Liverpool's budget was received too late to be incorporated in the first Supplementary Report last July. Now that we have their budget, this Report implements £3m holdback for Liverpool, after disregarding £2.6m of the City Council's expenditure. It would not have been fair to those other authorities to defer this Report. I will consider all requests for disregards before making the next Supplementary Report for 1984/85.

Q4 Will the Secretary of State for the Environment meet the City Council, as they have demanded?

A4 The City Council must put their own financial house in order. They know what they have to do. There is no case for a meeting especially given the peremptory terms of the demand, but I should be happy to consider carefully any written representations

Q5 Will the Government return the money 'stolen' from Liverpool/provide extra funds for the City?

A5 The Government already spends huge sums of money on Merseyside - over £1000m in 1984-85. There have been and will be no special extra funds for Liverpool. We did not submit to the Council's blackmail this year. We will not do so next year. The rest of the country is fed up with the raucous special pleading of the Militant Tendancy who run the Council.

Q6. Are you seriously suggesting that the Council should cut 6,000 jobs?

A6. Far more jobs will be at risk if the Council fail to act responsibly and balance their budget.

Q7. Why have you failed to keep your promise to provide the City with £130m in capital allocations for 1985/86?

A7. That allegation is a flat lie. I made no such promise. The Council must be living in cloudcuckooland if they ever thought such sums were possible.

Q8. Will the Government simply allow the City Council to collapse.

A8. It is the City Council which has the duty to run Liverpool. They must pull themselves together and act responsibly. If they fail to do so it is the people of Liverpool and the Council's own staff who will suffer.

CAPITAL EXPENDITURE

Q1. When will local authorities' capital allocations for 1985/86 be announced? What will the capital control regime be for 1985/86?

A1. I appreciate that authorities are anxious to know where they stand on capital so that they can make their plans for next year. I am sorry that we have not managed to make announcements coincide with the RSG settlement as usual. I cannot give a precise date or any details at present: we are still sorting out the position following the final decisions on public expenditure. But I hope that we shall be able to make an announcement very shortly.

Q2. Will the rate limits set for the rate-capped authorities make it difficult for them to service outstanding debt?

A2. No. The rate limits we have set reflect the expenditure levels announced earlier, which in turn make reasonable allowance for the expenditure which the authority will be properly required to incur next year, taking account among other things of the level of their outstanding debt and their need for new borrowing in the year. The servicing of loan debt is in any case the first charge on an authority's revenues. It is inconceivable - as we have made clear all along - that rate limitation should in itself force any authority into default on debt.

Q3. What if rate-capped authorities deliberately default on debt?

A3. That would of course be illegal. I am aware of the noises which some councillors have made. It is not for me to try to guess whether any of them will be so misguided as to propose such action formally to their authorities. But there are severe penalties on elected members for financial misconduct, including surcharge and disqualification. Anyone considering an act of deliberate illegality should remember that fact.

2f.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE STUDIES : KEY POINTS

The local government finance studies:

i. will be taking a fresh look at the whole field of local government finance;

ii. will be conducted internally under the guidance of Ministers; there is already a great deal of published evidence and analysis on this subject;

iii. when proposals have been formulated (unlikely to be in less than a year) there will be widespread consultation before any question of legislation arises.

Q&A BRIEFING FOR RSG STATEMENT: RATE LIMITATION

Q1. What information have you taken into account in the absence of applications for redetermination of ELs?

A1. I have taken into account all relevant information available to me, including that furnished by the designated authorities. I have had regard to the extent to which I judge information to be accurate and complete.

Q2. How have you set about reducing reserves (eg Leicester)?

A2. I have compared the reserves estimated to be held by each designated authority (to the best of my knowledge) with a reasonable level for authorities of that class, and have in general assumed use of reserves above that level to support expenditure in 1985/86; though with a constraint on the maximum possible reduction in a single year.

Q3. Why have you made allowance for authorities who have used special funds this year?

A3. It appears from information available to me that some authorities are planning to offset special fund money against spending this year, and might not have adequate reserves next year to avoid getting into difficulty if no allowance is made in the rate limit. I have made some allowance where this effect appears substantial.

Q4. Isn't this a backdoor way of redetermining the EL?

A4. No. I have no power to redetermine ELs in the absence of an application for redetermination. I have not received any. All I am doing is taking a judgement on the availability of reserves to the selected authorities.

Q5. Aren't you interpreting your power to "take account of financial reserves" very widely?

A5. No, I think that is precisely what I am doing.

Q6. Isn't Merseyside's precept limit extra-ordinarily high?

A6. Merseyside is affected by the adjustment I have made for special fund use. Their precept limit would have been lower if they had not budgetted to use special funds this year. Without rate capping their precept would certainly be even higher, so we are still protecting their ratepayers.

Q7. How will the GLC achieve a precept freeze when they have said they need at least a 9% increase?

A7. How the GLC obey the rate limitation law is a matter for them. The GLC is a profligate authority which is well able to make savings if it sets its mind to it. Its publicity budget alone is greater than the total spending of Durham. A precept freeze is a great Christmas present for Londoners.

Q8. ILEA have already declared a precept of 83.1p. Doesn't that mean that your precept limit is far too low?

A8. I am proposing a precept limit for ILEA of 74.2p. If that were confirmed, then ILEA would not be able to levy its so-called precept. But their announcement was just a publicity stunt. They are well able to make the savings necessary to bring their spending down to their expenditure level of £900m, and to bring their precept down to the level I am proposing. There are many areas in which they spend far more than other education authorities, and where they could make savings without damaging services. They have financial reserves. Of course, if they genuinely think they cannot meet my proposed limit, it is open to them to come and say so.

Q9. What can authorities do if they don't think their limit is practicable?

A9. They have until 15 January - over a month - to make a case to me for a higher limit. I shall take fully into account the arguments they put to me, and any other information available. I hope that, if they are genuinely concerned, they will put cases forward. It is not in their interests, or in the interests of their ratepayers, to carry on the senseless boycott which has operated in respect of applications for redeterminations of ELs. It is far better if we all cooperate to make the law work.

Q10. Some ratepayers won't feel protected where rate limits are an increase?

A10. 13 out of 18 of the limits represent a reduction from last year's rate. Some authorities set artificially low rates for this year by using balances; it would be difficult to get further reductions from so low a base. But even these authorities are now having their spending curbed, and so will be rating less in 1985/86 than they would have been without rate limitation. That is how we are protecting the ratepayer.

Q11. Some of the rate capped authorities are among poorest and most deprived in the country. Ought you really to be taking further money from them?

A11. I agree that some of these authorities (eg Hackney) have special needs. That is already recognised in their GREs (the cost of providing a standard level of services). For example, Hackney's GRE per head for personal social services is the highest in the country and three times the national average.

However these same authorities have been consistent overspenders, and indeed their over-spending meant that other authorities had to live within tighter targets. Rate limitation has meant that I have been able to set more generous targets for the lower spenders. For by rate limitation I can save about £400m that these high spenders would otherwise have spent.

All these authorities are spending way over GRE. There are undoubtedly ways in which they can cut waste and reduce spending without damaging services. If others can do it, why not them? For example, many of the so-called "poor" boroughs spend heavily on advertising that boarders on political propaganda. I hope they will now set to and look for savings, thus protecting their ratepayers, rather than waste time, money and effort in spurious complaints about being hard done by.

Addition to Flag F (or Flag A)

Q. Don't the 1985/86 GRE changes falsify the basis of selection of the 18 authorities for rate-capping? If the new GRE's had applied in 1984/85 (after the E7 change in particular) surely some of the 18 would have come below the GRE + 20% criterion?

A. No. In selecting autorities for rate-capping next year in July, I used the best information available to me at the time. I selected them on the basis of the comparison of their budgeted expenditure for the current year with both their target and their GRE. That was a wholly reasonable basis. GREs for 1985/86 were of course not available then. And anyway it would not be sensible to compare 1984/85 budgets with 1985/86 GREs, since they take no account of inflation. If their 1984/85 budgets are uprated for inflation, 17 out of the 18 selected authorities would be spending over 20% above their 1985/86 GRE. GREs will of course vary as we strive to improve the methodology in the light of comments from local government and others. [But I remain convinced that our criteria for selection of the 18 authorities for capping next year on the grounds of excessive spending were right and were the best available to us at the time.]

Rate Limits 1985/86

	Expenditure Level Col 1	Local rate 1984/85 Col 2	Rate Limit 1985/86 Col 3	rate increase implied by Rate Limit Col 4
Basildon	£ 13.662m	42.80p	50.33p	17.59%
Brent	£ 140.021m	193.42p	196.42p	1.55%
Camden	£ 117.429m	91.94p	92.02p	.09%
GLC	£ 785.233m	36.55p	36.52p	-.08%
Greenwich	£ 66.584m	118.91p	96.42p	-18.91%
Hackney	£ 82.315m	119.30p	114.09p	-4.37%
Haringey	£ 128.658m	229.16p	222.17p	-3.05%
ILEA	£ 900.366m	80.00p	74.19p	-7.26%
Islington	£ 85.564m	122.74p	111.21p	-9.39%
Lambeth	£ 113.558m	122.34p	107.57p	-12.07%
Leicester	£ 24.392m	37.50p	16.27p	-56.61%
Lewisham	£ 79.301m	115.74p	87.49p	-24.41%
Merseyside	£ 205.180m	65.00p	82.86p	27.48%
Portsmouth	£ 16.751m	27.20p	26.88p	-1.18%
Sheffield	£ 216.573m	208.24p	207.07p	-.56%
Southwark	£ 108.437m	149.74p	112.69p	-24.74%
South Yorkshire	£ 178.291m	83.30p	81.32p	-2.38%
Thamesdown	£ 14.199m	54.19p	57.22p	5.59%